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I. INTRODUCTION
In Nelson v. Dean,' a recent opinion by the Chief Judge of the Northern
District of Florida, Robert L. Hinkle discusses numerous aspects of the con-
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stitutionality of the Florida primary voting process.2 Among the issues dis-
cussed, although not thoroughly explored, is the funding of Florida's primary
voting process.3 Specifically, Chief Judge Hinlde presents this question
where he writes at the end of his opinion:
To be sure, plaintiffs hinted at oral argument that if their constitu-
tional and Voting Rights Act challenges to the DNC's exclusion of
Florida delegates was rejected-as has now occurred-plaintiffs
might assert that the change of the primary date itself was uncons-
titutional or violated the Voting Rights Act. Plaintiffs carefully
did not, however, actually assert that claim. The claim will not be
addressed unless and until actually presented. Leave to amend will
be granted. The granting of leave ought not, however, be read as a
suggestion that claims of this type would, or would not, have me-
rit.
Thus, is it unconstitutional for Florida to fund the primary voting system, yet
simultaneously employ a closed primary system that precludes all except
registered Democrats from voting in Democratic primaries, and precludes all
except registered Republicans from voting in Republican primaries, without
implicating the constitutional right to the freedom of association and the
competing Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.5
Furthermore, is it unconstitutional for the state to fund the participation
of the Democratic and Republican parties in the primary voting system, yet
refuse to fund the participation of a minor party in the primary voting sys-
tem? At the very least, the rights to the freedoms of assembly, association,
and equal protection are implicated.6 Interestingly, Florida appears to have
established one of the most exclusive primaries, in that it is a closed primary
which specifically precludes minor political parties from participating in the
primaries, thereby denying minor political parties funding which is available
for the Republican and Democratic state funded primaries.7 These very rele-
vant and timely issues are explored below.
of Florida School of Law, Class of 2009 for their invaluable research efforts that greatly con-
tributed to this article.
1. 528 F. Supp. 2d 1271 (N.D. Fla. 2007).
2. See generally id.
3. Id. at 1274-75.
4. Id. at 1283.
5. Id. at 1279-80.
6. Nelson, 528 F. Supp. 2d at 1279.
7. Id. at 1279-80.
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II. BACKGROUND OF PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES AND THEIR FUNDING IN
THE UNITED STATES
The Democratic and the Republican parties select their presidential no-
minees at the "national party convention[s] held [in] the summer of each
presidential election year. ' 8 In each state, presidential nominees receive del-
egates to the national conventions through caucuses, state conventions, or
primary elections.9 Caucuses and conventions are party funded meetings
where attendees choose nominees for the national convention.' ° In a prima-
ry, the registered voters choose the nominee by voting through a secret bal-
lot."
States employing the primary election system do so through state sta-
tutes providing for one of four different types of primaries: closed, open,
blanket, or semi-closed. 2 In a closed primary, which Florida has adopted,
"only persons who are members of the political party ... can vote on its no-
minee" who must be from their party. 3 Independents or members of another
political party cannot vote in the closed primary. 4 Each party sets a specific
deadline before the election by which one must register with that party or
change their party affiliation in order to vote in the primary.'5 In a semi-
closed primary, "a political party may invite only its own registered members
and voters registered as Independents to vote in its primary. In open pri
maries, anyone, "regardless of party affiliation, may vote for a party's nomi-
nee, . . . limited to that party's nominees for all offices ... [thus one] may
not, for example, support a Republican nominee for Governor and a Demo-
cratic nominee for attorney general."' 7 In a blanket primary, voters are not
limited to voting only for candidates of one party, but instead they can vote
for any candidate even if that candidate is affiliated with a different party.8
8. Leonard P. Stark, You Gotta Be on It to Be in It: State Ballot Access Laws and Pres-
idential Primaries, 5 GEO. MASON L. REv. 137, 138 (1997).
9. Id.
10. See Nelson, 528 F. Supp. 2d at 1272.
11. See Wagner v. Gray, 74 So. 2d 89, 91 (Fla. 1954) (stating that a primary election is a
"selective mechanism by which the members of a political party express their preference in..
. selection of ... party's candidates for public office... [and] are not in reality elections, but
are simply nominating devices").
12. David A. Chase, Note, Clingman v. Beaver: Shifting Power from the Parties to the
States, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1935, 1939-40 (2007).
13. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 570 (2000) (emphasis in original).
14. See Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 587 (2005).
15. See id. at 606.
16. Id. at 581.
17. Jones, 530 U.S. at 576 n.6.
18. Id. at 570.
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For decades, the primary system has been the most used delegate selection
system in the United States.
19
The primary election was developed as a way to choose presidential
nominees within the context of political parties.2' Although the United
States Constitution does not mention political parties, they emerged due to a
clash of notions between Alexander Hamilton's idea of a strong federal gov-
ernment and limited government advocated by Thomas Jefferson.2' As polit-
ical debate over the form of government continued, "[b]y the 1796 elections,
Federalists and Republicans" began organizing separate campaigns with par-
ty leaders having power over the nominations.22 The Republican Party soon
split into two smaller factions, the Democratic-Republican Party and the Na-
tional-Republican Party.23 Each party organized caucuses-informal meet-
ings-to choose party candidates for the national convention. 24 Because of
the concerns that small caucuses do not represent the will of the population,
party members began choosing delegates for the formal nomination meetings
in a convention. 21 Conventions, however, were criticized for a lack of trans-
parency, since party leaders influenced the nominations.26 Therefore, in late
nineteenth/early twentieth century, a primary developed as a delegate selec-
tion process, which, through secret vote, eliminated the problems raised by
the informal selection process of caucuses and conventions. 27 Once the states
began conducting primary nomination elections, the states became involved
19. Joanna Klonsky, The Caucus System in the U.S. Presidential Nominating Process,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., Mar. 3, 2008,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/15640/caucussystem-in-the-us-presidentialnominating-pro
cess.html.
20. Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, 882 F.2d 621, 629 (2d Cir. 1989).
21. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Roy R. Ray Lecture: Freedom of the Press in Time of War, 59
SMU L. REV. 1663, 1663-64 (2006); see also JOSEPH J. ELLIS, FOUNDING BROTHERS: THE
REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION 140, 198-99 (2000); Thomas B. McAffee, Natural Substance
Above All: The Utopian Vision of Modem Natural Law Constitutionalist, 4 S. CAL.
INTERDISc. L.J. 501, 525 (1995).
22. Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119
HARv. L. REv. 2311, 2320 (2006).
23. Mark L. Jones, Fundamental Dimensions of Law and Legal Education: An Histori-
cal Framework-A History of U.S. Legal Education Phase I: From the Founding of the Re-
public Until the 1860s, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 1041, 1050 (2006).
24. John R. Labbd, Comment, Louisiana's Blanket Primary After California Democratic
Party v. Jones, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 721, 722 (2002).
25. Deidra A. Foster, Comment, Partisanship Redefined: Why Blanket Primaries Are
Constitutional, 29 SEATrLE U. L. REv. 449, 451 (2006).
26. Leonard P. Stark, Note, The Presidential Primary and Caucus Schedule: A Role for
Federal Regulation?, 15 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 331, 332-33 (1996) [hereinafter Stark, The
Presidential Primary].
27. Id.
[Vol. 33
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in supervising the conduct of those elections, including the regulation of who
could vote in party primaries. 8 However, the original justification for that
regulation was to ensure that the nominees of the parties were elected in a
fair and impartial manner by the members of the party.29 The primary soon
became not only a delegate selection process of a particular party, but it was
enacted as a law in many states.3° In 1903, Wisconsin was the first state to
pass a law requiring the presidential nominees for the national convention to
be elected in the primary.31 Since then, states have passed laws which speci-
fy the criteria for state elections.32
Although political parties run presidential primaries, states fund and
pass various laws regarding the primaries.33 In the 1970s, campaign reform
proposals were elevated by the national attention paid to campaign fundrais-
ing abuses brought in light by the Watergate investigations. 34 In 1974, at the
height of the Watergate crisis, the federal government instituted a system of
matching public funds for presidential primaries and full public financing of
presidential general elections by amending the Federal Election Campaign
Act.35 In 1976, public money was used to fund a United States presidential
election for the first time.
36
"[T]he first public financing within the jurisdiction of the United States"
took place in Puerto Rico in 1957. 37 Costa Rica and Argentina, in 1954 and
1955, respectively, "were the first modem countries to formally provide pub-
lic fund[ing] for political parties. 38 Iowa, Maine, Rhode Island, and Utah
became the first states in America to enact public financing. 39 Maryland,
Minnesota, and New Jersey followed suit in 1974 with "the first partial pub-
lic financing systems."'4 By 2007, there were twenty-seven states that pro-
28. See id. at 332.
29. See id. at 332-33.
30. See Klonsky, supra note 19; Stark, The Presidential Primary, supra note 26, at 333.
31. Foster, supra note 25, at 452.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 453.
34. See Donald J. Simon, Beyond Post-Watergate Reform: Putting an End to the Soft
Money System, 24 NOTRE DAME J. LEGIs. 167, 167 (1998).
35. Kenneth D. Katkin, Campaign Finance Reform After Federal Election Commission v.
McConnell, 31 N. KY. L. REv. 235,239 (2004).
36. See Scott D. Slater, Comment, Where the Bucks Stop: An Analysis of Presidential
Telephone Solicitations Under 18 U.S.C. § 607, 59 U. Prrr. L. REv. 851, 879 n.247 (1998).
37. Benjamin J. Wyatt, The Origins of State Public Financing of Elections (Apr. 2002)
(unpublished B.A. thesis, Wesleyan University), available at
http://www.wesleyan.edu/wsa/scfr/thesis.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2008).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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vided some form of public subsidy in state elections.4' Out of those states,
eleven offered public funds to political parties for both general elections and
primary campaigns.4" Maine, Arizona, and Vermont follow the Clean Elec-
tions Plan under which the candidates may only receive public funds.43
I1. THE FOUNDATION OF THIS REPUBLIC-NO STATE GOVERNMENT
SHALL INTERFERE WITH ANY INDIVIDUAL'S FREEDOMS OF ASSOCIATION OR
ASSEMBLY
Necessarily, whether a party has a closed, semi-closed, open, or blanket
primary, one's First Amendment rights will be implicated; specifically, the
First Amendment right of the freedom to associate and the First Amendment
right to the freedom to assemble. 44 Most notably, a closed primary system
creates a prohibition on who one can vote for.45 Let's address, in turn, how
the freedom of assembly and the freedom of association are implicated, and
how some courts have dealt with them.
A. Freedom of Assembly
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
"Congress shall make no law... abridging.., the right of the people peace-
ably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of griev-
ances."' The right of assembly guaranteed in the Federal Constitution to the
people is not restricted to the literal right of meeting together to petition the
Government "'for a redress of grievances.' ' 47 According to one federal dis-
trict court, "the First Amendment itself is merely a limitation against federal
abridgment of the rights embodied in that amendment., 48 However, "the
[F]ramers of the Fourteenth Amendment, [which was] adopted after the Civil
War, made clear that no state or local government could censor political ex-
41. Id.
42. Wyatt, supra note 37.
43. Id.
44. See Chase, supra note 12, at 1939, 1941, 1950-52.
45. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 570 (2000).
46. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
47. See Thornton, 514 U.S. at 843 (citing Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496,
513 (1939)).
48. Thompson v. Bond, 421 F. Supp. 878, 881 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
[Vol. 33
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pression."49 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "pre-
vents any denial of [this right] by the states."5
When the First Congress was debating the Bill of Rights, it was con-
tended that there was no need to separately assert the right of assembly be-
cause it was subsumed in freedom of speech.5 Mr. Page of Virginia re-
sponded, however, that at times "such rights have been opposed, and [that]
people have . . . been prevented from assembling together on their lawful
occasions.... If the people could be deprived of the power of assembling
under any pretext whatsoever, they might be deprived of every other privi-
lege contained in the clause. 52 The motion to strike "assembly" was de-
feated.53
B. Freedom of Association
Although the word "association" does not appear in the First Amend-
ment, the freedom of association is derived from the First Amendment free-
doms of speech and assembly.' The freedom to associate "necessarily pre-
supposes the freedom to identify the people who constitute the association
and to limit the association to those people only.
55
A political party's right to choose its own nominees is a core associa-
tional activity.56 This is because "the inclusion of persons unaffiliated with a
political party may seriously distort its collective decisions. 57 As the United
States Supreme Court has repeatedly stated, political parties have associa-
tional rights, and one of those rights is the right to choose the "'standard
bearer who best represents the party's ideologies."'58 In Tashjian v. Republi-
can Party of Connecticut,59 the United States Supreme Court held that the
Connecticut statute requiring voters of any party primary to be registered
49. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and Our Posterity, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 573,
577 (1994).
50. Thompson, 421 F. Supp. at 881.
51. 1 ANNALS OFCONG. 731-32 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
52. Id. at 732.
53. Id. at 733.
54. See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 357 (1997); Tashjian v.
Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 214 (1986).
55. Democratic Party of the U.S. v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 122
(1981).
56. See Timmons, 520 U.S. at 359-60.
57. La Follette, 450 U.S. at 122.
58. See March Fong Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 224
(1989) (quoting Ripon Soc'y, Inc. v. Nat'l Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 601 (D.C. Cir.
1975)).
59. 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
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members of the party, conflicted with the Republican Party's rule permitting
"voters not affiliated with any political party-to vote in [the] Republican
primaries," and "deprive[d] the Party of its First Amendment right to enter
into political association with individuals of its own choosing."'  The Court
observed that "[tlhe Party's determination of the boundaries of its own asso-
ciation, and of the structure which best allows it to pursue its political goals,
is protected by the Constitution.' While "[t]he State has wide latitude to
regulate elections to ensure that they are fair and honest. . . the State cannot
first require parties to nominate by primary election, and then structure the
primary elections to deprive the parties of their First Amendment rights. 62
IV. GOVERNMENTALLY FUNDED CLOSED PRIMARY SYSTEM AND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS ON THE FREEDOM TO ASSOCIATE
Florida's statute establishing its closed primary system specifically
states:
In a primary election a qualified elector is entitled to vote the offi-
cial primary election ballot of the political party designated in the
elector's registration, and no other. It is unlawful for any elector to
vote in a primary for any candidate running for nomination from a
party other than that in which such elector is registered.
63
Also, Florida case law has, for more than seventy years, held that "no one is
entitled to vote in a party primary absent a declaration of his party affiliation
as a member of the particular party whose primary is being held."'  Al-
though no one appears to have challenged whether the aforementioned law
60. Id.at210-11.
61. Id. at 224.
62. Brief for the Petitioners-Appellant at 19, Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, No. 99-401
(9th Cir. Mar. 3, 2000). "California need not have a primary system at all. But if California
chooses to conduct primary elections, it must respect the political parties' freedom of associa-
tion." Id. (citing Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 218).
63. FLA. STAT. § 101.021 (2008).
64. State ex rel. Gandy v. Page, 170 So. 118, 120 (Fla. 1936).
The primary election laws of this state clearly require participants in primary
elections, whether as voters or candidates, to specially register for that purpose....
For primary elections a declaration of party affiliation on the primary election
books is indispensable to qualify one to participate in such primary elections. Ab-
sent such declaration of party affiliation, the registrant is not entitled to be consi-
dered as a legally registered member of the party whose affairs he seeks to partici-
pate in so far as primary elections... are concerned.
State ex rel. Hall v. Hildebrand, 168 So. 531 (Fla. 1936).
[Vol. 33
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violates a Florida citizen's freedoms to associate and assemble, the United
States Supreme Court has addressed this issue on several occasions.65
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the government's
ability to restrict the rights of individuals to participate in the primary
process for numerous reasons. For example, in Rosario v. Rockefeller (Ro-
sario I1),66 the United States Supreme Court rejected the citizens' argument
that "their First and Fourteenth Amendment right of free association with the
political party of their choice" was violated because of New York's delayed
enrollment scheme.67 An integral part of the scheme was that to participate
in a primary election, a person must enroll before the preceding general elec-
tion.68 As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated: "Allowing enrollment
any time after the general election would not have the same deterrent effect
on raiding for it would not put the voter in the unseemly position of asking to
be enrolled in one party while at the same time intending to vote immediately
for another."'69 For this reason, New York's scheme required an insulating
general election between enrollment and the next party primary.70 "The re-
sulting time limitation for enrollment [was] thus tied to a particularized legi-
timate purpose, and [was] in no sense invidious or arbitrary."'" Further, "the
statute merely imposed a time deadline on their enrollment, which they had
to meet in order to participate in the next primary. 72
The United States Supreme Court again recognized the propriety of re-
stricting participation in the primary process in Anderson v. Celebrezze.73 In
fact, the Court specifically recognized that "[a]lthough these rights of voters
are fundamental, not all restrictions imposed by the [s]tates on candidates'
eligibility for the ballot impose constitutionally suspect burdens on voters'
rights to associate or to choose among candidates. '74 The Court recognized
that, "'as a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elec-
tions if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than
chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes."' 75 The Court concluded:
65. See generally Rosario v. Rockefeller (Rosario II), 410 U.S. 752 (1973).
66. Id. at 752.
67. Id. at 758.
68. See id. at 757.
69. Rosario v. Rockefeller (Rosario 1), 458 F.2d 649, 653 (2d Cir. 1972).
70. See Rosario 11, 410 U.S. at 758.
71. Id. at 762.
72. Id. at 757.
73. 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983).
74. Id.
75. Id. (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)).
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To achieve these necessary objectives, States have enacted com-
prehensive and sometimes complex election codes. Each provi-
sion of these schemes, whether it governs the registration and qua-
lifications of voters, the selection and eligibility of candidates, or
the voting process itself, inevitably affects-at least to some de-
gree-the individual's right to vote and his right to associate with
others for political ends. Nevertheless, the State's important regu-
latory interests are generally sufficient to justify reasonable, nondi-
scriminatory restrictions.
76
In New York State Board of Elections v. L6pez Torres,7  regarding a
New York State Supreme Court justice election-as opposed to a presiden-
tial election-the Court "considered it to be 'too plain for argument,' that a
State may prescribe party use of primaries or conventions to select nominees
who appear on the general-election ballot.... That prescriptive power is not
without limits. '78 In California Democratic Party v. Jones,79 for example,
the Court invalidated California's blanket primary on First Amendment
grounds, reasoning that it permitted non-party members to determine the
candidate bearing the party's standard in the general election. 80 The Court
"acknowledged an individual's associational right to vote in a party primary
without undue state-imposed impediment.
81
In Kusper v. Pontikes,8 ' the Court invalidated an Illinois law that re-
quired a voter wishing to change his party registration so as to vote in the
primary of a different party to do so almost two full years before the primary
date. 83 But Kusper does not cast doubt on all state-imposed limitations upon
primary voting.84 In Rosario II, the Court upheld a New York State require-
ment that a voter enroll in the party of his choice at least thirty days before
the previous general election in order to vote in the next party primary.
Similar to the facts in Rosario II, in Florida, party changes must be
made by the end of the twenty-ninth day before the primary election. 86 As
such, it would appear that, in and of itself, Florida Statutes, section 101.021,
making it "unlawful for any elector to vote in a primary for any candidate
76. Id.
77. 128 S. Ct. 791 (2008).
78. Id. at 798.
79. 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
80. Id. at 586.
81. See Llpez Torres, 128 S. Ct. at 798.
82. 414U.S. 51 (1973).
83. Id. at 57, 61.
84. See generally Rosario I, 410 U.S. 752 (1973).
85. Id. at 757,762.
86. FLA. STAT. § 97.055 (2008).
[Vol. 33
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running for nomination from a party other than that in which such elector is
registered" would pass constitutional muster. 87 Furthermore, the twenty-nine
day requirement to change party affiliation, based on United States Supreme
Court precedent, is not overly burdensome and does not violate one's free-
doms to associate and assemble.88
V. IF GOVERNMENTS ARE INVOLVED IN FUNDING PRIMARIES, CAN
THEY LIMIT FUNDING TO JUST THE DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN
PARTIES?
A. Framers' Views on Parties
The Framers abhorred the "idea of political parties, representing institu-
tionalized divisions of interest.'' 89 This is the type of divisive political think-
ing that the Framers attempted to flee.90 In fact, the Framers "attempted to
design a 'Constitution Against Parties"' and curtail any tide of political com-
petition that might "divide coalitions of officeholders and cut through the
constitutional boundaries between . . . branches."9' Notwithstanding, in
1790, the Treasury Secretary, Alexander Hamilton, "began to recruit mem-
bers of Congress" to support "his economic development program."92 Tho-
mas Jefferson and James Madison intensely opposed the program, and the
two sides began to collect public support for their respective positions.93
By 1796, there were two competing parties: the Federalists and the Re-
publicans. 94 By 1797, its members were not only specifically identified as
Federalist or Republican, but they regularly and almost strictly voted along
party lines.9 The institutionalized division of interest that the Framers had
so desperately tried to steer clear of had been born.96
Such partisan politics that propagated divisive interests was harmful to
the separation of powers doctrine, and the Framers knew it.97 Pursuant to the
separation of powers doctrine, the executive branch has to be "genuinely
87. FLA. STAT. § 101.021.
88. See FLA. STAT. § 97.055; Rosario 11, 410 U.S. at 758 (holding that a New York law
establishing a thirty day deadline for voter affiliation is valid).
89. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 22, at 2320.
90. See id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 22, at 2320.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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independent!" 98 In fact, the Framers initially rejected ideas that the President
should obtain appointment by Congress." Any such requirement would be
wholly antithetical to executive independence."°  Notwithstanding, party
caucuses in Congress were the primary vehicle for selecting presidential
candidates.'' In fact, the Framers' vision of numerous candidates, as op-
posed to the presidential electoral process with just two political parties, was
meant to preclude the political and fundraising dominance that the Republi-
cans and Democrats enjoy today. l" Contrary to the Framers' intent, mem-
bers of smaller parties have little to no chance of having a successful presi-
dential campaign. 3
B. The State Funding of Democratic and Republican Party Primaries to
the Exclusion of All Others Implicates and Perhaps Violates the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
Limiting the state funding of primaries to the Democratic and Republi-
can parties contributes to the political and fundraising dominance discussed
above. z" First Amendment freedoms to assemble and associate necessarily
conflict with equal protection concerns, because the support of one or two
political organizations with public financing to the exclusion of others impli-
cates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 10 5 Of
course, these First Amendment freedoms are entitled under the Fourteenth
Amendment to protection from infringement by the States."° Consequently,
limiting the state funding of primaries exclusively to the Democratic and
Republican parties is the centerpiece of the constitutional uneasiness because
of the potential violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 0 7 That is, does limiting funding of primaries to just two politi-
cal parties invidiously discriminate against all other parties in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause?
98. Id. at 2321.
99. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 22, at 2321.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See id.
103. See Benjamin D. Black, Note, Developments in the State Regulation of Major and
Minor Political Parties, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 109, 111 (1996).
104. See id. at 111-12.
105. See id.
106. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276-77 (1964).
107. Black, supra note 103, at 135-36.
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1. United States Supreme Court Decisions
In one of the most cited and well recognized cases regarding the limit-
ing of funding to the Democratic and Republican primaries, Williams v.
Rhodes, 1 8 the Court was confronted with a state electoral structure that "fa-
vor[ed] two particular parties-the Republicans and the Democrats-and in
effect tend[ed] to give them a complete monopoly."' 9 The Court held un-
constitutional the election laws of Ohio as they violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment insofar as in combination they "made
it virtually impossible for a new political party, even though it [had] hun-
dreds of thousands of members, or an old party, which [had] a very small
number of members, to be placed on the state ballot" in the 1968 presidential
election."' The state laws made "no provision for ballot position for inde-
pendent candidates as distinguished from political parties,' and a new po-
litical party, in order to be placed on the ballot, had "to obtain petitions
signed by qualified electors totaling [fifteen percent] of the number of ballots
cast in the last preceding gubernatorial election."'"12 But this requirement was
only a preliminary hurdle." 3 Although the Ohio American Independent Par-
ty in the first six months of 1968 had obtained more than 450,000 signa-
tures-well over the [fifteen percent] requirement"4--Ohio had nonetheless
denied the party a place on the ballot, by reason of other statutory "burden-
some procedures, requiring extensive organization and other election activi-
ties by a very early date,"" 5-"including the early deadline for filing peti-
tions and the requirement of a primary election conforming to detailed and
rigorous standards."'" 6 Justice Douglas candidly stated:
Ohio, through an entangling web of election laws, has effectively
foreclosed its presidential ballot to all but Republicans and Demo-
crats. It has done so initially by abolishing write-in votes so as to
restrict candidacy to names on the ballot; it has eliminated all in-
dependent candidates through a requirement that nominees enjoy
the endorsement of a political party; it has defined "political party"
108. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
109. Id. at 32.
110. Id. at 24.
111. ld. at26.
112. Id. at 24-25.
113. Williams, 393 U.S. at 25.
114. Id. at 26.
115. Id. at 33.
116. Id. at 27.
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in such a way as to exclude virtually all but the two major par-
ties. 11
7
While Williams seemed adamantly opposed to a state law that appeared
to create a duopoly shared by the Democrats and Republicans, 1 8 in American
Party of Texas v. White," 9 the Court found other differential treatment to-
wards the minor parties constitutional.' 2" The Court was confronted with
whether a state law prohibiting a minor party from not having a primary elec-
tion, but relegating it to a convention, was invidiously discriminatory and in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
2 1
The Court rejected assertions of invidious discrimination. 22 Specifically, the
Court rather conclusorily refused to find that "the convention process [was]
invidiously more burdensome than the primary" process. 23 The appellant
could not demonstrate discrimination of "some substance" nor could the ap-
pellant demonstrate any offense to the Constitution.
24
The White Court, however, did seem to validate a threshold requirement
for a government funded primary election for a minor political party when it
dealt with whether a Texas provision "provid[ing] for public financing from
state revenues for primary elections of only those political parties casting
200,000 or more votes for governor in the [prior] general election" violated
the Equal Protection Clause. 25 The Court upheld the validity of the provi-
sion, reasoning that a political party should not be made to bear the burden of
the additional expense of a state required primary election. 126 Furthermore,
the Court also held that the State was justified in not providing funding to
political parties which had not previously shown such widespread public
support. 27 The Court specifically stated: "[W]e cannot agree that the State,
simply because it defrays the expenses of party primary elections, must also
finance the efforts of every nascent political group seeking to organize it-
self. 12
8
117. Id. at 35-36 (Douglas, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
118. See Williams, 393 U.S. at 32.
119. 415 U.S. 767 (1974).
120. Id. at 794-95.
121. Id. at781.
122. Id. at 793-94.
123. Id. at 781.
124. White, 415 U.S. at 781-82.
125. Id. at 791-92.
126. See id. at 793.
127. See id. at 794.
128. Id.
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2. Florida Statutes Outright Deny Primaries-Let Alone Funding for Pri-
maries-to Minor Political Parties
In each year in which a general election is held, a primary election
for nomination of candidates of political parties shall be held on the
Tuesday 10 weeks prior to the general election. The candidate re-
ceiving the highest number of votes cast in each contest in the prima-
ry election shall be declared nominated for such office. If two or
more candidates receive an equal and highest number of votes for the
same office, such candidates shall draw lots to determine which can-
didate is nominated.
129
Whenever any special election or special primary election is held
as required in s. 100.101, each county incurring expenses resulting
from such special election or special primary election shall be
reimbursed by the state. Reimbursement shall be based upon ac-
tual expenses as filed by the supervisor of elections with the coun-
ty governing body. The Department of State shall verify the ex-
penses of each special election and each special primary election
and authorize payment for reimbursement to each county af-
fected. 3 0
So how do these laws apply to minor political parties seeking to conduct
a primary election-they do not. 3 ' The primary election method of nominat-
ing candidates is not available to minor political parties. 132 Pursuant to sec-
tion 97.021(17), Florida Statutes, a minor political party is defined as fol-
lows: A "'[m]inor political party' is any group as defined in this subsection
which on January 1 preceding a primary election does not have registered as
members [five] percent of the total registered electors of the state."'133
129. FLA. STAT. § 100.061 (2008).
130. FLA. STAT. § 100.102 (2008).
131. See State ex rel. Merrill v. Gerow, 85 So. 144, 146 (Fla. 1920).
132. See generally State ex rel. Barnett v. Gray, 144 So. 349 (Fla. 1932); Gerow, 85 So. at
146 (stating that the rights and powers conferred and granted by the primary election laws are
limited to those political parties that, at the general election for state or county officers preced-
ing a primary, polled more than five percent of the entire vote cast in the state).
While the Florida Election Code provides that qualified candidates for nomi-
nation to an office are entitled to have their names printed on the official primary
election ballots, this provision necessarily means the qualified candidates of the so-
called major political parties because the primary election laws apparently apply
only to such parties.
21 FLA. JUR. 2d Elections § 120 (2005).
133. FLA. STAT. § 97.021(17) (2008).
2008]
15
Berger and Haile: The Constitutional Implications of Government Funding for Florida
Published by NSUWorks, 2008
NOVA LAW REVIEW
Notably, the aforementioned statutory requirements are similar to the
statutory requirements set forth in White and Williams v. Rhodes. In light of
the historically significant failure of laws like this to provide any footing for
third parties who seek a primary election, it seems clear that the application
of this in Florida raises constitutional concerns and this issue needs to be
revisited. In Florida, if a third party wished to conducted a primary election,
and on January 1, 2008, decided that it wanted to be placed on the presiden-
tial primary ballot for the primary election that took place on January 29,
2008-the date of Florida's primary-the third party would have to rely on
whether it met the five percent threshold during the last race, which was the
gubernatorial race which took place in November 2006.134 This is a deadly
blow to any third party, as historically, third parties tend to grow their sup-
port and constituents nationally, as exemplified by the significant support
garnered by Abraham Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, Robert LaFollette, Eu-
gene Debs, Henry Wallace, Strom Thurmond, George Wallace, John Ander-
son, and H. Ross Perot, each of whom garnered at least seven percent of the
votes during the elections. 135 However, the chance of third parties reaching
the five percent threshold in Florida at the time of the previous gubernatorial
election is practically nonexistent given the nature of our political history and
how third parties, or any political party, are formed and emerge to national
prominence. Indeed, the first two parties, the Federalists and the Antifede-
ralists, were formed around supporting and opposing national issues and
agendas. 36 Of course, during any particular primary, the Democrats and
Republicans have their established base, and that established base will likely
remain intact from one primary to the next. 37 However, that maintenance of
an established base is not necessarily with any of the third parties, which
usually flow from national grassroots efforts that are catalyzed by some fi-
nancial and/or political distress that occurred since the previous primary.'
It is this national uprising, as opposed to the limited likelihood of a statewide
uprising, that gives any third party a chance to succeed. Clearly, the present
primary system institutionally supports the maintenance of the Democratic
and Republican bases of support.
134. See id.
135. Paula Shaki, Third Parties Influential in Past, Present Elections, available at
http://www.collegian.psu.edu/archive/1996-jan-dec/1996_oct/1996-10-
07 the -daily-collegianr1996-10-07d0l-004.htm (Oct. 7, 1996); Results of Presidential Elec-
tions, http://www.usconstitutional.net/elections.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2008).
136. See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 22, at 2319.
137. See generally James Bennet & Keith Bradsher, Republicans Again Courting Demo-
crats and Independents, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 21, 2000, at Al.
138. See generally id.
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Moreover, the present primary system financially supports the mainten-
ance of these respective bases of support. In fact, the state funding for the
Democratic and Republican primaries in Florida averaged over $5 million in
2008." 9 Third parties do not get any support through state funding. Thus,
each of the two established major parties has a $5 million advantage over any
third party seeking to have a primary."4
Notwithstanding the unlikely occurrence of any minor party achieving
the five percent threshold, if the threshold is hurdled,
[any group of citizens organized for the general purposes of elect-
ing to office qualified persons and determining public issues under
the democratic processes of the United States may become a minor
political party of this state by filing with the department a certifi-
cate showing the name of the organization, the names of its current
officers, including the members of its executive committee, and a
copy of its constitution or bylaws. It shall be the duty of the minor
political party to notify the department of any changes in the filing
certificate within 5 days of such changes.'
41
More importantly, if a Florida citizen has concluded that her political
interests are not represented by the major political parties, and she seeks to
exercise her rights to political association and assembly via a minor political
party, pursuant to section 103.091(4), Florida Statutes, she will not be al-
lowed to participate in the primary:
Any political party other than a minor political party may by rule
provide for the membership of its state or county executive commit-
tee to be elected for 4-year terms at the primary election in each
year a presidential election is held. The terms shall commence on
the first day of the month following each presidential general elec-
tion; but the names of candidates for political party offices shall not
be placed on the ballot at any other election. The results of such
election shall be determined by a plurality of the votes cast. In such
event, electors seeking to qualify for such office shall do so with the
Department of State or supervisor of elections not earlier than noon
of the 71st day, or later than noon of the 67th day, preceding the
primary election. The outgoing chair of each county executive
committee shall, within 30 days after the committee members take
office, hold an organizational meeting of all newly elected members
139. See generally Beth Reinhard & Rob Barry, Florida Lucrative for McCain, MIAMI
HERALD, Feb. 22, 2008, at 6B.
140. See generally id.
141. FLA. STAT. § 97.021(17) (2008).
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for the purpose of electing officers. The chair of each state execu-
tive committee shall, within 60 days after the committee members
take office, hold an organizational meeting of all newly elected
members for the purpose of electing officers.1
42
The burden created by the Florida Legislature appears to have over-
stepped its constitutional boundaries as delineated by the Equal Protection
Clause.143 As discussed in Williams v. Rhodes, the state legislature violates
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when it makes it
"virtually impossible for a new political party... to be placed on the state
ballot."' 44 Like the Ohio statute in Williams, Florida statutes have placed on
minority parties an unconstitutionally high hurdle in front of third party can-
didates running for president. 45 In light of the clear enhancement that the
Florida statutes give to the two major parties by aiding their members ability
to engage in the freedoms to associate and assemble by funding their prima-
ries with upwards of $5 million each, in conjunction with their failure to aid
minor parties in the same way, and the considerable tension with the Equal
Protection Clause stemming from, the application of the Florida statutes, as
well as the United States Supreme Court's rulings, make it "virtually imposs-
ible for a new political party ... to be placed on the state ballot."'146 Accor-
dingly, a serious constitutional challenge could be mounted against Florida's
presidential primary as it is presently constituted. 47 As previously stated,
historically, third parties only emerge from presidential election cycles, not
gubernatorial election cycles. As such, relying on gubernatorial election
cycles deliberately inhibits the growth of third parties to the benefit of the
two major parties making this state action constitutionally suspect. Florida
has debilitated any opportunity for a third party to succeed as a presidential
candidate. 48 In effect, Florida has unconstitutionally institutionalized a two
party system. 49
VI. CONCLUSION
The First Amendment rights to associate and assemble for the purpose
of advancing shared beliefs, including political beliefs, are two of the most
142. FLA. STAT. § 103.091(4) (2008).
143. See id.
144. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 24 (1968).
145. FLA. STAT. § 103.091(4); see generally Williams, 393 U.S. at 23.
146. Williams, 393 U.S. at 24.
147. See generally id.
148. See generally FLA. STAT. § 103.091(4).
149. See generally id.
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precious rights provided to each citizen of this nation. The Framers held an
unabashed obsession for protecting these rights, and these rights are to be
protected by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from
infringement by any state. 50 Only time will tell whether the Supreme Court
will opine on the constitutionality of Florida's statutes, but application of
previous Supreme Court case law, and the facts of how modem third parties
emerge in American politics, appear to make the constitutional viability of
Florida's statutes increasingly suspect.
150. See generally Williams, 393 U.S. at 23.
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